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Abstract 
This article contends that there is a growing, if uneven, crisis in public sector trade 
unionism masked by relatively high membership figures that obscure a weakening of 
trade unions in the workplace that leaves hollowed out organization vulnerable to 
further legislative and employer-led onslaughts.  The weakening is not inevitable but 
to overcome it requires a refocusing of organizing efforts on the everyday concerns of 
members such as understaffing and the provision of better public services.  Only with 
an engaged membership will national issues and wider campaigns have any material 
force. Having outlined a general argument, the article takes as illustrative the nature 
and performance of trade unions, and particularly UNISON, during the Mid 
Staffordshire Hospital crisis. 
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The Crisis of Public Sector Trade Unionism: Evidence from the Mid 
Staffordshire Hospital Crisis 
Almost 20 years ago, the TUC responded to falling trade union membership by 
introducing the ‘organizing model’ through its New Unionism strategy (Heery 1998).  
The atrophy of the British trade union movement has continued regardless, with fewer 
absolute numbers and an even greater reduction in density, from 32 percent in 1995 to 
26 percent by 2011 (Brownlie 2012). Trade union density in the public sector is 
higher, standing at 56.5 per cent in 2011, compared to 14.1 in the private sector.  As a 
result, over 62 percent of union members are in the public sector (ibid.). The 
immediate fortunes of the movement appear therefore to rest on the resilience of this 
sector.  As Richard Hurd has argued in the US, however, it would be a mistake ‘to 
conclude that public sector unions are strong, stable, and immune to the external and 
internal influences that have brought private sector unions to their knees’ (cited in 
Burns 2015: 53-4).  Relatively high density should not be allowed to hide falling 
membership: from 4.11 million in 2009 to 3.88 million in 2011, with a loss of 
186,000 members in 2010-11.  Nor should density figures mask the significant decline 
in collective bargaining.  According to the authors of the latest WERS (2011): 
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Collective bargaining takes place in less than three fifths (57%) of public 
sector workplaces, setting pay for a little over two fifths (44%) of public 
sector employees, down from over two thirds in 2004. Strongly unionised 
workplaces where 100% of employees have their pay set by collective 
bargaining have been a rarity in the private sector for some time. But they 
are increasingly uncommon in the public sector too (van Wanrooy et al. 
2013: 22).  
 
According to the Institute of Fiscal Studies (2014: 1) ‘The public sector workforce 
stood at 5.7 million in mid-2013, and made up just under 20% of total employment, 
low than at any point in at least the last 40 years’. On-going cuts in public expenditure 
pose an acute threat to public sector unions and hence the wider fortunes of British 
trade unionism. As well as expenditure cuts directly shedding jobs, there has been a 
general erosion of the wages of public sector labour especially in the years since the 
economic crisis of 2008 and the onset of austerity, adding demoralisation to rising 
insecurity.  The New Economics Foundation (NEF) found that the public sector had 
been hard-hit by ‘the sequence of a 2-year pay freeze (three years in local 
government) and then a 3-year pay cap’, the effect of which was ‘to reduce median 
and average gross pay in the public sector by a prospective 13% across the period’ 
(NEF 2013: 8).  As a consequence it estimated that: ‘one million public service 
workers are on low pay, including health and social care workers, school staff and 
local authority employees’ (ibid.: 6). According to UNISON’S own research: 'When 
the national minimum wage was introduced in 1999, the bottom NJC [National Joint 
Council] pay point was over 24% above it. Now it’s just 2% above' 
(http://www.unison.org.uk/njc-14-44). Alongside the erosion of wages, workers have 
likewise experienced pension changes that have seen higher employee contributions, 
lower benefits, longer working lives and a reduction in the rate of inflation proofing.  
Moreover, the widespread anger towards these changes has been dissipated by 
ineffectual union action. Hurd’s warning is even more apposite given the 2015 
election of a Conservative government openly hostile to public sector unions and with 
the prospects of even greater expenditure cuts. 
 
Trade unions have performed poorly even in the arena that they feel most confident – 
the demands that can be quantified.  Unions frequently channel a variety of grievances 
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into wage demands – one has only to remember the not so historic claims for payment 
of ‘dirty money’ and compensation for injuries as alternative to demands for clean 
and safe working environments.  A substantial rise is easier to negotiate than respect 
at work.  Yet it is conditions and relations at work that frequently come to the 
foreground when talking to public sector workers.  Teachers’ main employment 
concerns are workload and the growth of targets and intrusive monitoring. Healthcare 
workers worry about understaffing, arbitrary rotas, sickness monitoring and the extent 
of bullying.  Civil servants complain about the management of change, understaffing, 
targets and performance monitoring.  Without necessarily explicitly connecting the 
effect of these practices, workers in all sectors are concerned the impact of them on 
their ability to perform a public service.  As Burns (2014: 69) notes ‘Caring intensely 
about their work, public workers often gravitate[d] towards issues that motivated their 
membership, and dovetailed with the public good’.  Nevertheless, focused and 
systematic trade union opposition to manifestations of management’s control of the 
workplace and the related degradation of services is muted in the UK and workers’ 
complaints largely unorganised. 
 
There are a number of reasons for the lack of unions’ workplace effectiveness.    
Relatively high density and coverage obscure evidence that unions in many public 
sector workplaces have been effectively ‘hollowed out’.  The fortunes of UNISON, 
the largest public sector union with 1,254,000 members, are crucial for unionism as a 
whole. Since its formation in 1993 it has lost 250,000 members despite a number of 
strategies to raise the figure back to 1.5 million (Waddington and Kerr (2105).   One 
of the objectives was to use branch development and organising plans to require 
branches to implement policies directed towards increasing the number of lay 
representatives (UNISON, 1998) and to bring about a ratio of 1 lay representative for 
every 50 members.  However, the proportion of members with a lay representative 
present at their workplace fell from 72.3 per cent in 1999 to 70.2 per cent in 2000 and 
then to 52.3 per cent in 2009 (ibid. 2015: 9).  
  
UNISON is a particular example of hollowing out, but an important one.  The process 
across public sector unions is uneven (Simms et al. 2013) as the contexts in which 
unions operate (concentrations of employment, occupational identities and disruptive 
capacities) and their leaderships and strategies differ markedly: the firefighters’ union 
 4 
is not UNISON.  Nevertheless, there are some general features at work.  The merger 
of unions has been a largely bureaucratic and defensive process.  One of the things 
sometimes lost in such mergers is a sense of occupational identity as a source of 
organisation.  To be an engineer or a patternmaker was a source of pride and self-
esteem that formed the basis of demands for respect and craft control of work 
processes.  UNISON, despite coming into the world with a large nursing membership, 
has failed to build upon this base and struggles to recruit nursing students. The Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) brings apparent prestige and is focused solely on nurses. 
Where nurses are present in UNISON they are more likely to be represented by non-
nurses ‘with the consequence that many health professionals may view UNISON as a 
union for grades other than their own’ (Waddington and Kerr 2015).  
 
While it can be argued that craft consciousness led too frequently to sectionalism 
(Hobsbawn 1978), its atrophy and its lack of representation within trade union 
structures has resulted in a marked lessening of disputes over changing labour 
processes.  Trade union officials in UNISON, the biggest public sector union in the 
UK, cover wide areas and very general categories of workers.  In local government 
representation includes numerous job titles such as teaching assistant, social worker 
and environmental health officer.  In the health sector, the job categories include 
nurses, health care assistants, administrative workers, porters, and professions allied 
to medicine.  Moreover, officials are moved around from one sector to another as gaps 
arise.  The result is that officials tend to be generalists as expressed by one local 
government official complaining about social worker members:  ‘they think they are 
different from librarians’ (fieldnote).  It may well be that a redundancy is a 
redundancy wherever it happens (although it would be important to examine the 
contexts – redundancies can be instances of trade union victimizations or racial 
discrimination).  To imply, however, that you might need to know nothing of social 
workers’ professional codes of practice, in order to give guidance or promote 
organization is mistaken.  Acting as a generalist can desensitize officials from the 
need to listen and to use opportunities to generate effective responses and to organize 
around issues such as the inappropriate use of unqualified staff or heavy caseloads 
that result in mistakes for which social workers are dismissed (‘Official sacked over 
Baby P case’. BBC News. 2008-12-01) 
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Even where professional matters are not directly the issue, lack of focus on other 
workplace issues can cause serious problems for members and a consequent 
alienation from their organizations when higher levels of the union do not take the 
issues sufficiently seriously enough. Fisher (2005: 159) maintained that the union 
Public and Commercial Services (PCS) demonstrated: ‘an as a yet too uncritical 
understanding of the significance and future potential for the degradation and 
devaluation of work’ and that this failure signaled a crisis in public sector trade 
unionism.  Similarly in a later response to the introduction of Lean techniques to HM 
Revenue and Customs, PCS actively promoted national union action for increased 
wages, against changes in pensions and redundancy compensation, but effectively 
undermined action against the degradation of work through Lean reorganization of the 
labour process (Author A et al. 2012). Elsewhere, teaching unions accepted many of 
the elements of workforce remodeling that promised (without delivering) short-term 
benefits while weakening teacher autonomy and control (Author A and ANO 2012). 
With few exceptions (see Darlington 2009 on the Rail, Maritime and Transport 
union), organisation for control of the production process appears to present trade 
unions as institutions grave difficulties. Public sector unions, with their weak tradition 
of workplace bargaining, appear to experience the problem more intensely. 
 
The contention that there is a growing crisis is reinforced here through analysis of 
union responses to workplace change and the deterioration of care at Mid 
Staffordshire hospital.  Evidence to the Francis Inquiry (2010-12) demonstrates that 
the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and UNISON had no strategy for integrating 
issues of professional codes and concerns with the standard of patient care with trade 
union demands.  As a result unions neither engaged effectively with issues of 
understaffing, work degradation and intensification, nor with the resulting poor 
healthcare provision. Consequently patients and relatives in the form of Cure the NHS 
(CNHS) came to view health service unions as narrowly self-interested and complicit 
in excess deaths highlighted by official reports.  Rather than being seen as part of the 
coalition for better healthcare, unions came to be seen in Mid Staffordshire as part of 
the problem.   
 
The argument is constructed by first examining literature on public sector unionism to 
establish that there is evidence that experiences at Mid Staffordshire are not unique 
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and that rather than being exemplars of union renewal public sector unions are being 
hollowed out. Proceeding from the Methodology, that both justifies the use of the 
Francis Inquiry as a primary source, and reinforces the claims that the experiences 
documented are paralleled elsewhere, the article looks at the evidence presented by 
the RCN and UNISON to illustrate their practice at Mid Staffordshire, before 
concluding more positively that the integration of both professional codes of practice 
and the employers’ duty of care into trade union demands would impact on day-to-
day practice, enhance public services and improve the morale and conditions of 
employees and increase their engagement with unions. 
  
The Hollowing Out of Public Sector Unionism 
The Donovan Commission’s (1968) report on employment relations centred on the 
private sector, particularly the engineering industry, reflecting political concern with 
unofficial strikes in heavily unionized manufacturing industries (Fox and Flanders 
1969).  In the intervening period, governmental concern has largely migrated to the 
public sector.  Although the number of strikes are shared almost equally between 
public and private sectors, in 2010 over 80 percent of all days lost were in the former, 
a reflection of larger numbers of participants (Office for National Statistics 2012).  
Higher trade union density and an increased propensity to strike also account for 
academic interest from those seeing in public sector unions the chance for a 
revitalized union movement.  Darlington (2010: 129), for instance, contends that there 
is: ‘important, albeit often neglected, evidence of continuing resilience and even 
combativity in certain areas of employment, notably within the public sector’.   
 
Fairbrother (1994, 1996, 2000) has been consistent in maintaining that the 
decentralization of management decision-making has stimulated a process of union 
renewal with the latter viewed as democratic, participatory and locally based forms of 
organization. Fairbrother et al. (2012) reiterated that the changing organization of the 
state sectors provides a dynamic for structural change in public sector trade unions 
that in turn presages union renewal.  Examining New Public Management (NPM), and 
the consequent enhancement and devolution of management power, they assert that 
attempts to marginalize trade unions ‘appear to have provided the impetus for union 
renewal and revitalisation’ (2012:5).  Their judgement of the extent of renewal is 
ambiguous and qualified, but, nevertheless, contends that renewal is occurring, 
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evidenced by a ‘long-term trajectory towards more participative forms of 
representation, accountable leaderships and an activist approach to both managerial 
initiatives and government policy’ (2012: 210).  Moreover, the discussion is 
generalized beyond their specific study to suggest that renewal claims have wider 
purchase across the entire public sector.  Not only is there an assumption of a single 
‘public sector labour process’, the work is also international and comparative, further 
suggesting its generalisability.  In contrast, over a long period, other narratives 
describing developments in public sector see no evidence of successful union renewal 
(see, for instance, Colling 1995 on local government unionism; Author A 2004 on 
teacher unionism).  A number of studies focusing on the National Health Service 
(NHS) unionism also give little cause for trade union optimism. 
 
Conservative governments before 1997 implemented features of NPM in hospitals 
(fragmentation through establishing Trust hospitals, centralization through target 
setting, privatization and marketisation) that established the recognized preconditions 
for union renewal. Lloyd (1997: 429) reviewing NHS workplace unionism contended 
that the ‘evidence of “renewal” in these studies is relatively limited’. The central 
tenets of NPM continued under subsequent Labour governments, together with 
additional promotion of social partnership with trade unions and structures established 
at national, regional and at local levels to ensure that union representatives had 
adequate time and support to participate in the implementation of the Agenda for 
Change (2004).  The less hostile government stance made it no less difficult to 
promote strong local union organization.  Bach’s (2004) study of employee 
participation and union voice, focused on nursing and ancillary staff in three 
contrasting Trusts, documented common issues of union powerlessness and 
demoralization. Even where relations with management were good, unions were 
threatened by the exclusion of union representatives from various groups, a practice 
that ‘did not support the principle of partnership working’ (ibid.: 12). Where density 
was high (60 percent), members ‘were relatively passive and their reluctance to take 
on representative roles encouraged little turnover among a handful of long-serving 
staff-side members (ibid.: 14). Bach’s conclusion was that there is ‘a widespread staff 
perception that [unions] have little control over what happens at their workplace and 
that their voice is not heard’ (ibid.:18). 
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Evidence suggests that, notwithstanding UNISON’s status as an ‘organising union’ 
(Waddington and Kerr 2009), union vibrancy at the workplace has been limited and 
its influence especially over issues of job control.  Bryson et al (1995: 132) noted that 
‘by blurring professional demarcations attacks the power of the professional 
organization at its heart, i.e. by shifting control from health professional to manager 
about how a job is done and what skills are required to do it’.  Employer strategies 
have remained constant, with Upchurch et al. (2008: 111) detailing how social 
partnership has aided the further detachment of unions from opposition to 
organisational and labour process changes: 
 
Management hostility or support could constrain union renewal 
opportunities, the latter by incorporating union representatives in the 
management of workplace change that employees experienced as 
increased surveillance and exhortation to achieve performance targets. 
 
Little wonder that their survey found only 21 per cent of surveyed employees and 24 
per cent of those who were union members agreed or strongly agreed that ‘unions 
make a difference to what it is like to work here’ (2008: 129).   
 
The ‘what it is like to work here’ and particularly the impact of changes on 
professional practice are frequently not integrated into industrial relations studies of 
hospitals.  Cooke’s (2006a) findings that nurses saw work intensification as the main 
factor affecting standards of nursing care and, (2006b), that union representatives 
were overwhelmed by disciplinary procedures and frequently bypassed by managers 
utilizing informal mechanisms outside the formal disciplinary procedures, have not 
encouraged considerations of how trade unions address these issues.   
 
Methodology 
This article focuses on the union failure to integrate professional issues of patient care 
and trade union practices and the consequences for membership engagement.  The 
article uses evidence from trades unions given to The Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (2013) (hereafter Francis Report) as its primary 
source. The inquiry chaired by (now Sir) Robert Francis QC was established to 
investigate what the various NHS local, regional and national commissioning, 
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supervisory and regulatory bodies and systems had done (or not done) to detect or 
prevent poor care at Stafford which had resulted in some 400-1200 patient deaths. The 
inquiry was both in-depth and long-running, taking oral evidence from 164 witnesses 
as well as 87 witness statements and totaling a million pages of evidence.  
 
Stafford hospital was a district general hospital in the West Midlands of England. It 
was the largest part of the Mid Staffordshire Hospitals NHS Trust, later to become a 
Foundation Trust in 2008. Five official reports into the deaths of patients culminated 
in the Francis Report (2013). Care was poor before 2006, but was seriously worsened 
by redundancies and restructuring that took place in early 2006 cutting staffing levels, 
changing skill mix and subordinating patient care to financial targets necessary for 
achieving “Foundation Trust” status.  
 
In mid 2007 the Healthcare Commission (HCC), the then NHS care regulator, was 
warned that Stafford seemed to have unusually high death rates for its patient mix.  
Eventually immense pressure from the local CNHS campaign group, formed by 
relatives of those who had died, forced a Public Inquiry. Francis found misdiagnosis 
and fundamentally poor care in several parts of the hospital.  Amongst other things: 
patients were often left on commodes or in the toilet for far too long; often left for 
long periods in sheets soiled with urine and faeces; meals were placed out of reach 
and taken away without being touched; cloths were used both to clean ward surfaces 
and toilets; and receptionists without medical training assessed patients coming in to 
the Accident and Emergency department (A&E) (see Francis Report 2010: Executive 
Summary).  
 
Francis found morale was low and reported: ‘I heard much evidence suggesting that 
members of staff lived in an atmosphere of fear of adverse repercussions in relation to 
a variety of events. Part of this fear was promoted by the managerial styles of some 
senior managers’ (Francis Report 2010: B. 37).    His conclusions were especially 
critical of Trust leadership and the impact of the Trust Board's decision to try to save 
£10m in 2006-07, as part of its desire to gain Foundation Trust status. 
  
There are a number of justifications for using the Francis Report as the prime source 
for the research.  Firstly, it enables the research to build on works already highlighted 
 10 
in the literature review. The profile of trade union membership at Mid Staffordshire 
was unlikely to vary much from that in hundreds of other hospitals. Certainly none of 
the national officers giving evidence claimed any exceptionalism as an explanation 
for the practice of the unions and their own ignorance about what was occurring: just 
the reverse – the reason why union officials were not sensitive to the problems was 
there were so many institutions in which circumstances were similar to Mid 
Staffordshire that it did not warrant special consideration.  A number of the witnesses 
indicated that trade union practices and patient experiences of care were little different 
elsewhere.  A subsequent review by Sir Bruce Keogh (2013), the Medical Director for 
England, confirmed that the themes identified by Robert Francis were indeed common 
to a greater or lesser extent in the 14 Trusts he examined and it has become clear since 
that there are systemic problems across the NHS in which performance management, 
targets, bullying and insufficient staffing establishment form a toxic mix. 
 
Thirdly, while replicating findings in a large number of hospitals, the Inquiry uniquely 
examined written evidence and verbal testimonies under oath from a range of sources 
including union representatives and regional and national officers.  The lines that 
were pursued were not necessarily identical to the ones that might have been adopted 
had an independent research study been designed.  It is doubtful, however, whether 
crucial access to national and other full-time officials would have been granted given 
the defensive nature of many of the contributions, and certain that any responses 
would not have had the threat of perjury hanging over them.  
 
The focus of the Francis Report was only in part on trade union practice.  For the 
purposes of this study only contributions by and about unions were examined. 
Evidence comprised written submissions and verbal responses to cross examinations 
from: one General Secretary, one National Official, one Regional Official and three 
local shop stewards together with the Committee’s reflections on them. In all this 
amounted to 100s of pages. There are a number of ways to analyse the features of 
successful trade unionism ranging from Kelly’s (1998) attempt to promote 
mobilization theory, to various emphases within what has become known as the 
organizing model (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Author A 2006; Simms et al. 2013). 
The data here are analysed using criteria from Fairbrother et al’s organisational 
processes said to be indicative of renewal: ‘recruitment and extension of the 
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membership base; replenishment of new generations of activist members; building 
workplace- and community-relevant structures and activity; mutually supportive 
relations between layered levels of representation’ (2012: 41).  
 
Disconnected Trade Unionism  
The Royal College of Nursing 
The RCN is the principal UK voice of the nursing professions with over 400,000 
members, organized nationally into 15 regions.  It sees itself as having two distinct 
but linked functions: a professional one and a trade union one. The former role 
involves delivering courses and presentations on nursing issues as well as ‘creating 
policies and providing general advice on matters such as staffing levels’ (Carter, 
Statement: 2) (quotations are from the Francis Inquiry unless otherwise stated).  
Although a Royal College, its powers are considerably less than other Royal Colleges 
in that it cannot enforce standards though it does seek to set them. Its trade union role 
immediately signals two significant characteristics.  Firstly, it qualifies the conflict of 
interest between employers and its members through the assurance that “Each [RCN] 
Regional Director will have good relationships with the senior figures at the hospitals 
and Primary Care Trusts in their region’.  Secondly it is a servicing organization: “It is 
fair to say we work for our members.  The vast majority . . . join for indemnity and 
the support we can offer’ (ibid.: 2). The membership section of its website 
(https://www.rcn.org.uk/membership) stresses that it also offers advice and the 
support to 4000 workplace representatives in planning, learning and health and safety 
requirements and a central career advice service; a campaigning voice; and a range of 
discounts.  The model it holds is one of a respected pressure group: its professional 
role outweighs its trade union organization and representational roles.  Tellingly, it is 
the Royal College of Nursing, not Nurses, and has as its patron Queen Elizabeth II. 
 
Recruitment and extension of the membership base 
RCN had approximately 500 members within the Trust in 2011 (Legan, Day 42: 104).  
The Trust’s Annual Report 2008-9 stated there were 764 Nursing and Midwifery staff 
out of a total of approximately 3000 employees Allowing that some would belong to 
the Royal College of Midwives and some to UNISON, and that it accepts into 
membership Healthcare Assistants, the figures still suggest a high percentage of 
nurses were RCN members.  Whatever the formal levels of membership and density 
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there was little in the way of collective consciousness and involvement.  According to 
the lead RCN representative at the Hospital, who had 28 years as a representative, her 
main contact with members was ‘Predominantly . . . through branch meetings 
(Breeze, Statement 2011: 4).  However, members only attended branch meetings 
when there was a problem and then in very small numbers (‘under ten’) (Breeze: Day 
42: 12).  Another representative reported that nurses ‘didn’t really see the point of  . . . 
talking to us, the RCN, because they didn’t feel that we were being instrumental in 
making things any better’ (Adams, Day 51: 28). 
 
Replenishment of a new generation of activists 
The organizational structure of the RCN was rudimentary. There were only three local 
representatives and a safety ‘officer’ during the period 2005-9 (when the branch also 
covered another hospital, community practices and members in the prison service, an 
estimated total membership of 1400) (Breeze, Day 42: 7).  Nor were they distributed 
to ensure even coverage within or across the sites, with representation dependent upon 
who volunteered (ibid.: 7). The lead representative considered that the optimum 
numbers of representatives were between eight and ten but was fatalistic about 
increasing them: ‘You can’t pressurize people into becoming reps . . . and people 
don’t come forward . . . because they don’t like speaking up’ (ibid.: 10).  The few 
representatives were not overwhelmed with members’ demands due to the lack of 
confidence in the RCN and positive encouragement not to utilize the organisation: 
 
If a member did have a problem with patient care, other than completing 
an incident reporting form members could raise concerns with their line 
manager (ibid.: 5). 
 
It is hard to imagine that Breeze could have remained totally ignorant of the emerging 
problems of the hospital and her members’ concerns. She, however, stated that no one 
had ever reported these to her and that she could not recall these issues being raised at 
joint staff side trade union meetings (JSSC).  When asked whether she thought the 
threat to patient care, caused by redundancies, should have been raised at the Joint 
Negotiating and Consultation Committee (JNCC) she replied: ‘I really can’t comment 
on it’, causing a sharp rejoinder from the Chair: ‘Well you can because you were 
there’ (ibid.: 48). 
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Evidence from other RCN representatives clarified whether Breeze’s stance was 
exceptional or illustrated general practice of the RCN at the hospital. The second 
RCN representative, Sue Adams, a Day Unit Speciality Manager, had five years’s 
experience as a representative at the time of the Inquiry. Her approach had a clearer 
representative orientation. When members reported problems or concerns to 
representatives, the latter ‘were able to feed this information back to their lead 
stewards’.  In turn, Breeze ‘could escalate these matters to the Trust’s Executive 
Team, at various forums, including JNCC, one-one meetings etc.’ (Adams, Statement: 
2-3). Adams gave every impression that she was much more alive to the issues of the 
hospital, which she discussed with the third representative, with whom she also 
visited wards to talk to members. The weakness in her account was suggesting that 
relaying issues to Breeze would guarantee they received attention. Nor was there 
evidence that reporting issues directly to the regional RCN was effective.  Adams 
reported, for instance, that when concerns about the hospital ignoring incident reports 
were raised by a nurse ‘nothing appears to have happened’ (Adams, Day 51:65) 
 
There were occasions when Adams objected to hospital policy both as a Day Ward 
Manager and an RCN union representative.  In the former capacity she documented 
understaffing, writing in 2004 to a consultant podiatric surgeon about threats to 
patient care and detailing her unsuccessful attempts to have posts filled (Statement: 
6).  She raised concerns as an RCN representative over the amalgamation of the day 
and short-stay surgery wards at JNCC meetings.  Failure to achieve anything stemmed 
not from her personal qualities but from a combination of the intransigence of the 
hospital and the ineffectiveness of the RCN as an organization. 
 
Mutually supportive relations between layered levels of representation 
RCN representatives needing support and advice received no leadership on major 
issues such as the move to gain Foundation Trust status, the financial preconditions of 
which exacerbated existing staff shortages.  Adams’ view was that ‘the RCN were 
generally very laissez-faire, about the Foundation Trust proposal’ and that officials 
‘proffered no view either way about whether Foundation Trust status was a good or 
bad thing’ (ibid.: 10).  More significantly, the Region seemed unconcerned about the 
state of union organization at the hospital.  When questioned about the role of Breeze, 
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and her claimed lack of knowledge of widespread staff concerns about overwork and 
care quality, Adams insisted that she and the other steward raised them with her in 
numerous fora (ibid: 40).  She took her concerns about Breeze’s ineffectiveness to the 
Regional Office (ibid. 41): ‘we needed more support because Denise wasn’t able to 
come to meetings, she wasn’t getting to go to patch meetings, she didn’t always get to 
staff-side meeting’.   Again there was no union response. 
 
This situation would have been clear to the full-time officer, Adrian Legan, 
responsible for the hospital.  Legan’s remit was in part ‘to support and develop local 
branch activity and advise and represent members in relation to employment issues’ 
(Legan, Statement: 1-2). Patently, the development of the branch had been 
unsuccessful. There were too few RCN stewards, a complaint Legan endorsed.  But 
on this, as other issues, he was at pains to point out that in this the hospital was 
typical: ‘There are never enough staff representatives’ (Legan 42: 112).  Nor were low 
levels of membership participation abnormal: ‘there was no more or less engagement 
in Stafford than any other organization or branch that I support’ (Statement: 112).  At 
Mid Staffordshire it is unclear what was done to alter this situation despite, according 
to Breeze,  the full-time officer being there ‘most of the time’, a claim Legan disputed 
(Legan 42: 134). Breeze stated that ‘He was always there on hand and dealt with all – 
anything major, any reorganization, anything like that’ (Breeze 42: 98).  Legan 
acknowledged that Breeze ‘did tend to consult with me . . . when she did not have 
time to assist a member, and so she would contact our office’ (Legan, Statement: 3). 
Breeze on her own admission did very little (Breeze 42: 19), a situation that Legan 
appeared not to question. 
  
Given the extent of his involvement it might be expected that the full-time officer 
would be aware of the concerns about serious staff shortages, particularly as Adams 
maintains that the issue was discussed and reported. He maintained that, had he 
received a complaint of that nature, ‘then I’m pretty confident that that would be 
retained at a regional level and acted upon’ (Legan 42: 132): but he also added: 
 
. . . quite often the response from the trust [to staff shortages] would be 
that it was attributable to short-term sickness or they were aware . . . of 
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global issues around staffing concerns and were addressing matters’ (ibid; 
132).   
 
Management’s contention that problems were restricted to short-term sickness, rather 
than to chronic and structural understaffing, appears to have been internalized: ‘I 
think most of the concerns regarding staffing would have been around short-term 
sickness.  So it would have been pertinent to a particular shift . . . it wasn’t necessarily 
a long-term issue’ (ibid.: 213).  
 
Nurses might have found it harder to accept this view, although they would likely be 
entirely in the dark about the conversations that gave rise to it. RCN representatives 
were not told of the nature and outcome of meetings between RCN officials and 
management. Despite frequent meetings between Legan and the Chief Executive of 
the Trust (CEO), for instance, Adams reported: 
 
As a steward I was not told when the full-time officers at the RCN were 
visiting the Trust.  This meant it was very difficult to know when they 
were speaking to the Trust’s Executive team and whether any issues were 
being raised or acted upon (Statement: 4). 
 
The debilitating effect of this approach to members and representatives also impacted 
directly in other ways. Legan’s close relations with management, were apparent in the 
case of the nurse whistleblower, Helene Donnelly, who reported bullying, poor care 
standards and falsification of records in the Accident and Emergency department 
(A&E) resulting in the suspension of two Sisters.  She sought support from Legan 
(Donnelly, Statement: 8). Initially he appeared ‘horrified by what was happening in 
A&E’, but she was disappointed that she didn’t hear back from him for some time.  
When she did hear, he informed her that the Sisters ‘had received a slap on the wrist’ 
and would shortly be returning to work, that team building was to be scheduled and 
that ‘everything would be fine’ (ibid.: 8). She felt exposed and vulnerable and later 
discovered that he was representing at least one of the sisters in discussions with the 
trust. The Inquiry discovered that the Sisters did indeed return with a first warning as 
a result of a private agreement between Mr Legan and Martin Yeates [the CEO]i. 
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The way the RCN conducted itself at Mid Staffordshire was not unique. There was 
widespread disengagement of members, with a reluctance to report issues to the RCN.  
Peter Carter, its Chief Executive and General Secretary, cited the example of the 
problems at Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust, ‘which included reports of 
patients being left in excrement and beds being only 8 inches apart’ that ‘were never 
raised by any of our members’ (ibid.: 3).  The apparent imperative of close relations 
between management and the RCN, as at Mid Staffordshire, to the exclusion of 
dialogues with its membership, was also indicated by Carter: ‘If there are no issues in 
a particular hospital, the officer may not visit the hospital at all . . . However, these 
officers may call the Director of Nursing to ask if they can visit to discuss matters 
generally’ (Carter Statement: 4-5). 
 
The collaborative orientation of the RCN informed the nature of the visit that Carter 
made to Mid Staffordshire Hospital shortly before the Health Care Commission 
Report (2008) revealed the care crisis. Carter neither sought, nor was given, a prior 
briefing on the serious issues at the Trust (Carter 52: 24).  On the visit he met two 
full-time staff from the regional office and also the hospital Chief Executive and the 
Director of Nursing.  He could not recall whether he had met Sue Adams (he did not) 
and his tour of the hospital was conducted with the RCN senior full-time officer and 
the Director of Nursing.  He made no attempt to meet his members, was not informed 
of any issues, nor saw evidence of understaffing and poor patient care. 
 
Following the visit, the CEO wrote and thanked him particularly for how the RCN 
had been repositioned ‘in terms of constructive and supportive dialogue as we face 
inevitable change in the NHS’ (Exhibit PC1).  Carter (Statement: 7-8) believed this 
reference related to the fact that: ‘In the past, the RCN had been quite conservative in 
relation to change’.  In contrast, the RCN was now ‘repositioned to support change in 
the interests of patient care’ which ‘can often be difficult for our members to 
understand’.  In his willingness to support the hospital, Carter wrote to the Director of 
Nursing saying: ‘I have seldom been as impressed with the standard of care as I 
witnessed at Stafford Hospital’ (ibid,: 8). He also wrote a letter with similar 
sentiments to the local newspaper.  It was not until after the publication of the HCC 
Report (2008) that Carter returned to Stafford for a meeting with his members. 
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Responses to Francis 
 
UNISON 
The RCN is not a typical union seeking as it does to be both a representative and a 
professional body.  For this reason alone it would not possible to regard its health as 
indicative of the state of public sector unionism.  The position of UNISON is much 
more central with over 1.2 million members across the public sector of which around 
450,000 members are in the health service (Jennings: Statement).  Clearly it is a major 
player in industrial relations within hospitals. It also claims to be an ‘organizing 
union’ (Waddington and Kerr 2009) although, as indicated above, there is much 
evidence to challenge this.  Moreover as Saundry and Wibberley (2013: 296) have 
concluded, illustrating a problem that was all too apparent at Mid Staffordshire:  
 
the erosion of collective bargaining has locked local branches into a 
dynamic of individual representation whereby a small number of activists 
are placed under increasing strain in responding to a growing caseload. 
This has arguably produced a dependent and remote relationship between 
union members, their branches, and their full-time officers.  
 
 
Recruitment and extension of the membership base 
UNISON had 814 members in the Hospital, comprising nurses, ancillary and clerical 
employees.  No breakdown of its membership figures was available but only a 
minority would have been nurses, giving the RCN the lead voice in matters that were 
specific to this role.   According to UNISON branch secretary, Kath Fox, ‘there was 
always good attendance’ at annual general meetings and ‘if there was a particularly 
contentious issue going on, there would usually be about twenty people at branch 
meetings’ (Witness Statement: 2). There was no evidence, however, of increased 
membership numbers or activity and certainly nothing resembling an organizing 
culture had taken hold. 
 
Replenishment of a new generation of activists 
UNISON was formally better organized than the RCN, having eight representatives in 
the hospital for the 800 or so members and mechanisms existed for positions to be 
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contested through nominations and elections. The leading figure of UNISON, Kath 
Fox, was a Bereavement Officer, who had nearly 20 years’ experience in the union, 
performing roles from representing members at stage one sickness reviews to 
negotiating pay reviews with management.  She also attended UNISON meetings at 
weekends and consequently felt pressed for time and unsupported:   
 
When I first became a trade union rep, we would deal with things such as 
normal day-to-day grievances, sickness reviews, that type of thing . . . now – 
your local reps are expected to do the role of full-time, paid trade union 
official, and we can’t do that and hold a job down at the same time (Fox Day 
43: 129). 
 
While there is no evidence of replenishment of activists, the representatives were not 
inactive.  Like Sue Adams, Fox insisted that representatives had raised staff shortages 
from 2005 onwards and that these concerns were not accurately reflected in JNCC 
minutes.  She acknowledged that unions had not raised patient safety as such at the 
meetings but maintained: ‘It was taken for granted that if you had a fully staffed ward 
patients would receive the proper care’ (Fox Statement: 7). The responses to concerns 
raised by unions about understaffing were generally ‘that staffing levels were 
adequate in the “professional view”’ (ibid.: 7).  
 
Mutually supportive relations between layered levels of representation 
While the role of the RCN official was arguably conservative, his presence was 
undeniable and his influence tangible. In contrast, the role of the UNISON full-time 
officer was almost entirely absent and the links between the workplace and the region 
negligible. When asked about escalating issues through the union, Fox testified that 
escalation should come through the take up of issues by the Regional bodies and that 
the UNISON full-time officer frequently attended JNCC meetings so that regional 
officials would therefore have been aware of the hospital’s problems.  After a recess, 
counsel for the Inquiry, having had JNCC minutes from 2005 and 2009 examined, 
found that attendance had been restricted to one occasion.  Fox responded that the 
minutes of every meeting would be automatically forwarded to the regional officer 
but was forced to admit that, while she hoped that the minutes were read, no one ever 
got in touch to discuss any of the issues contained within them.  
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No evidence was produced of any regular (or even occasional) inquiry about local 
developments by the UNISON regional office.  As a result of this lack of engagement, 
and because ‘none of the ftos [full-time officers] were taking  - or appeared to be 
taking things seriously’, the branch looked for other ways of raising concerns about 
understaffing and decided to send Fox to see David Kidney, Labour MP for Stafford, 
to determine ‘whether he could do anything’ (Fox, 43: 114). This avenue was closed, 
however, when Kidney was reassured by the hospital CEO that processes were in 
place to alleviate the concerns and wrote to Fox to that effect.  
 
Unfortunately the UNISON regional official made no statement: nor was she heard at 
the enquiry.  Had she been, the practice and thinking of the union might have been 
further scrutinized.  However, the national secretary for health, Karen Jennings, both 
made a statement and was questioned at the Inquiry (by which time she had been 
promoted to an assistant general secretary). She described the role of the national 
office as ‘very strategic’ focusing on national bargaining and developing policies and 
guidance for members that was cascaded down (Jennings, 43: 8). Regional officers 
were available to ‘give advice to branches when they can’t handle something or they 
have concerns about something, or where they need further expert advice’ (ibid.: 12).  
There appeared to be no apparent mechanisms for discovering when the relationship 
was not working. The regional officer’s absence from the trust only became apparent 
after Jennings’ evidence and she was not confronted about it.  When reflecting on the 
fact that the national union knew nothing of issues at Mid Staffordshire, Jennings 
stated that ‘it was perfectly open for the branch to write directly [to national office] on 
these matters’ (ibid: 20). To the suggestion that going to an MP to raise the issues 
demonstrated desperation on the part of the branch, Jennings again reiterated that ‘it is 
up to the branch to feel that they can come to the national office.  It is up to the 
regional office to raise it with the national office’ (ibid.: 20).  
 
National officials’ roles were portrayed as passive and constrained.  When asked 
about systems for monitoring trends and developments she responded that they could 
only established if there was an instruction from their regions or annual conference: 
‘our primary aim throughout the year will be looking at what we’ve been mandated to 
do’ (43: 22). Asked about individual issues communicated directly to the national 
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office, Jennings stated:  ‘we . . . refer that letter to the regional office and to the 
branch to deal with’.    When pointed out that letters in relation to Mid Staffordshire 
would therefore probably have ended up back on Fox’s desk, her reply is ‘Or the 




Building workplace and community relevant structures and activity: Unions and the 
JNCC 
The prime forum for joint trade union activity at hospital level was the JNCC. 
Representatives of other JNCC unions were wary of the RCN because of the 
relationship between Legan and the trust management. UNISON representative, Kath 
Fox, stated that the RCN, and Legan in particular, played a key role in the JNCC but 
also outside of it: ‘meetings were taking place between the RCN full time officer and 
management . . . outside the context of the JNCC, which undermines the JNCC role’ 
(Fox Statement: 12).  Legan’s testimony reinforces the claim. When replying to 
questions about redundancies and understaffing he revealed:  
 
I was constantly reassured that even when there was talk of 180 posts [to 
be made redundant] that these would not include front-line nursing staff . . 
. but predominantly would be looking at other areas, not necessarily 
clinical areas (42: 156).   
 
Such reassurances were given when the other unions, as the principal causalities of 
this policy, would not have been present.   
 
Nevertheless, there was united union opposition of sorts when in 2006 the trust 
proposed 180 redundancies. Staff unions coalesced around resisting both compulsory 
redundancies and the shortening of the consultation period from the statutory 90 to 30 
days. The lead official in this resistance was the full-time officer from Unite, with a 
much smaller healthcare membership. While the Trust quickly, if reluctantly, 
conceded on the issue of complying with the statutory redundancy consultation 
period, and relented on the compulsory nature of the redundancies, these changes did 
nothing to save any jobs, which, the Inquiry concluded, seriously impacted on patient 
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care. Voluntary redundancies and normal staff turnover exacerbated the already 
chronic understaffing, worsened conditions, increased pressure and further lowered 
health care standards.  
 
There was no attempt by representatives to mobilize members or to use other avenues 
to challenge management.  No mention is made of attempts to gain evidence of the 
impact of the redundancies by conducting a members’ survey, holding ward or site 
meetings, or insisting on union involvement in the risk assessment to which unions 
were entitled.  No links were made with those nurses who had signed a collective 
letter of protest. Neither is there any mention of contacting the HCC, the service 
regulator, or the Nursing and Midwifery Council, the professional regulator for 
advice. Statutory rights were not utilised: TULCRA s.188 (4) requires employers to 
meaningfully consult and to provide the real reasons (and supporting information) for 
redundancies.  The Trust had no accurate record of how many nurses it employed, nor 
was it able to show the Inquiry any clinical risk assessment of the impact of planned 
cuts indicating that a challenge to them would have caused difficulties.  
 
Conclusion: The Duty of Care and Trade Unionism 
The evidence here joins a growing body of work documenting problems faced by 
public sector unions.   RCN and UNISON had substantial memberships at Mid 
Staffordshire but were unable or unwilling to mobilize them around important 
workplace issues.  The internal relations were as those described by Saundrey and 
Wibberley (2013): dependent and remote between union members, their branches, and 
their full-time officers. Little wonder that members, with a few notable and isolated 
exceptions, were, as elsewhere (Bach 2004), demoralized, quiescent and complicit in 
the accepting poor standards. Members of both unions, like those studied by Cooke 
(2006a), endured heavy work demands and struggled to provide care with 
unacceptably few resources.  Their commitment to patients found no way of asserting 
itself and coalescing as a force against hospital policies.  Had the trade unions 
successfully demanded that patients received adequate and safe care, staff conditions, 
satisfaction and morale would have improved, making staff allies with patients and 
relatives groups.  Instead, the demand was never clearly made despite independent 
staff surveys suggesting deep dissatisfaction with the standard of care in the hospital. 
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Within Mid Staffordshire both unions maintained they were largely (and in the case of 
UNISON entirely) unaware of the problems of understaffing and poor healthcare 
provision: it is a defense that is at the same time an indictment.  Though the RCN 
referred to its policy document on staffing levels, neither union had a strategy for 
linking understaffing and working conditions to good healthcare standards despite an 
abundance of easily available evidence. The absence of such a strategy was 
highlighted in their opposition to compulsory redundancies, leading the Francis 
Inquiry’s counsel to comment: 
 
This episode did show the trade unions standing their ground and 
protecting their members’ rights.  It showed them operating in their 
natural sphere rather than concerning themselves with the risks to patients 
arising from the proposed redundancies. (Francis Report: final written 
submission: 376)  
 
An alternative strategy could have mobilized members around their professional code 
of conduct and the hospital’s duty of care.  In order to practice, nurses have to be 
registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), and registration requires 
adherence to its professional code of conduct.  As only registered nurses can be 
employed, adherence to the code becomes an implicit part of nurses’ contracts of 
employment and they cannot be asked to breach it directly or ask other staff to breach 
it.  Had the unions documented unsafe practices and, for instance, only followed 
written instructions to work in such situations, managements’ culpability would have 
been visible, embarrassing and unsustainable.  Often senior staff issuing instructions 
are also registered practitioners and subject to same professional codes.  Indeed, in 
January 2014, the director and chief nurse responsible for nursing at Mid 
Staffordshire was struck off the NMC register after it was found that she had 
endangered patients, and that she had shown no insight into her failings (Nursing 
Times 29 January 2014).  
 
Rather than highlighting the employers’ responsibility to enable safe practice, the 
RCN accepted the senior nurse’s individualization of nurse responsibilities to abide 
by their professional code of practice, thus leaving staff open to threats from 
managers. Sue Adams (Statement: 16) reported that nursing staffs were told that ‘if 
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they considered staffing levels were unsafe that this was a breach of the NMC Code 
of Conduct . . . and they should be very careful about what they put in a formal 
complaint as it might lead to them losing their job’.    Fox (Statement: 9) reflected a 
similar sentiment, stating: ‘From everything I have learnt, professional standards and 
accountability is down to the individual nurse and not UNISON to maintain’.  This 
narrow interpretation deflects attention from managements’ over-riding 
responsibilities towards both patients and their staff.  Failure to effectively challenge 
this management approach thus marginalized patient safety as an issue around which 
to mobilise. 
 
RCN representation is dominated by senior staffs (Hart 1994) and has a professional 
orientation.  It has authoritative guidelines and recommendations on good nursing 
practice and as early as 2006 published research on the impact of low staffing levels. 
However, it had little organization at the workplace and its Annual Report (2013) 
suggested that this was part of a wider problem: ‘Numbers of representatives continue 
to decline, due in part to the impact of the tough economic climate on NHS and 
independent providers and in part to a policy decision to focus on quality standards’ 
(2013: 7) (emphasis added). Campaigning for staffing ratios without local 
organization to monitor or enforce them will likely prove ineffective, especially if, as 
in Mid Staffordshire, officials are more comfortable talking to directors than 
mobilising members, making a change of direction difficult. UNISON, on the other 
hand, encouraged a routinised trade union response that largely ignored issues of 
work organization and content. As its Head of Nursing framed it: ‘We are a trade 
union, not a professional association’ (Nursing Times: 14/5/2013). There is little 
indication that within UNISON occupational identities and related workplace 
concerns are treated as issues around which to mobilize. Even where UNISON 
produces national guidelines over staffing levels, for instance, it increasingly does not 
have the organization to negotiate or enforce them at the workplace, and members’ 
day-to-day concerns risk escaping practical attention.  
 
In the wake of the Francis Report both unions published responses.  The lengthy RCN 
response (RCN 2013b: 5) stated that: 
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Robert Francis discussed the role of the RCN in his report and highlighted 
that we could have done more locally to support our members on the 
ground.  This is something the RCN readily acknowledged in its initial 




Since the events at Stafford Hospital were first reported, we have 
undertaken significant work to improve the support we provide our 
accredited representatives and active members, and to improve the way our 
members can raise concerns about standards of care (ibid.: 8). 
 
UNISON’s much later, much shorter response (UNISON 2013) included no 
acknowledgement of, or reflection on, any of its own shortcomings in Mid 
Staffordshire, nor any lessons learned by the union.  Neither union has drawn the 
conclusion that they need to move towards an ‘organising ‘ approach’.  
 
Britain will almost certainly continue to witness public sector strikes, albeit largely 
one day and symbolic. Resistance to concerted reductions in the living standards of 
their members, especially in the public sector, has largely been ineffectual and 
certainly has not been able to reverse any of the major government policies worsening 
pensions, retirement ages and pay.  A concentration on these issues, to the exclusion 
of engagement with the daily issues that confront their members within the workplace 
will likely see further detachment and disillusionment with trade unions. Nor is the 
solution to hope that Labour win the next election in 2020.  All the circumstances 
propelling the Mid Staffordshire crisis occurred under a Labour government and 
throughout its period of office trade union fortunes declined. Unions in the public 
sector, but not exclusively, have the ability to champion public service standards and 
in doing so engage and enthuse members who continue to care for the services they 
provide.  This entails changing strategies and in the process having an internal fight to 
transform the unions into really effective organizations. To fail to do this will have 
societal consequences well beyond the reduction of unions to smaller organizations 
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i The two were subsequently struck off the nursing register by the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council, (http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jul/25/mid-
staffordshire-nurses-struck-off) 
 
